Curious what you make of new directions in consequentialism such as 1) scalar consequentialism (no permissible/impermissible, just better and worse) and 2) agent-centered consequentialism.
I think scalar consequentialism is great. Every consequentialist should be a scalar consequentialist. In fact, the best defense of consequentialism I’ve ever seen has not been any academic paper, but rather Richard Chappell's blog @rychappell. That being said, I don’t think scalar consequentialism avoids the problem I raise. I argue that it would be absurd to say one is obligated to maximize utility in utopia. Now, the scalar consequentialist need not make that claim. But they still have to claim that it is most reasonable to maximize utility in utopia. And that seems nearly just as implausible to me. So, I think scalar consequentialism has been a nice development, though I don’t think it solves all of consequentialism’s problems.
I have less strong opinions about the “consequentializers”, mainly because I don't know much about them. I’d need to see how they handle options, because those are important to me. But if one could “consequentialize” progressive deontology, then I’m not sure I’d be opposed, though I’m not sure of what significance this would be.
I've always wondered what deontology should say about the dynamics of relationship formation.
You write:
"Special obligations are obligations we have to people due to our relationships with them. For example, you might be obligated to help your friend over a stranger because they are your friend."
In that case, would it be best to minimize forming relationships in the first place, so that we can avoid burdensome obligations, which lessen our ability to focus on helping those most in need from an agent-neutral standpoint?
It seems to me like traditional deontologists end up saying that we are permitted to ignore the significant needs of strangers for the sake of the trivial needs of our friends in the name of "friendship". If that is really what friendship is, then it requires us to make the world worse in intuitively unacceptable ways. So, I don't think that could be what friendship is. In my view, what makes friendship special is not that friends sacrifice the well-being of strangers for each other. What makes friendship special has more to do with the fact that friends sacrifice their *own* well-being for each other--well-being that they must be entitled to in the first place. So, in my view, we do not have to avoid forming friendships now, because special obligations do not permit us to ignore the basic needs of others in the first place.
Nice essay. I love the options/constraints framing. A couple of thoughts:
(1) Why can’t consequentialists accommodate your insights by noting that, as the world improves and opportunities for effective altruism dwindle, you get relatively more bang for your moral buck by focusing on your own projects and plans?
(2) Your view has a Christian feel: through good works we “buy” our freedom (“as soon as coin in coffer rings, the soul from purgatory springs”). But whereas christianity is individualistic your view is collectivist: I, as an individual, can’t buy my freedom with good works, no matter how much I do, as long as there are basic needs unmet. But why not? If deontology has any virtues, it’s that it gives individuals freedom from collective responsibility. If you’re not going to give us that you might as well be a consequentialist proper, no?
Thanks Misha! Those are really interesting points. Here are some thoughts I had about them.
Okay, so maybe a consequentialist can design their theory so that in 2871 our prudential reasons align with our consequentialist reasons. Hence, what makes the world slightly better happens to be intuitively worthwhile things like working on personal projects. But I have some doubts:
The first thing that comes to mind is that this consequentialist theory is still not generating the right kinds of reasons. I don’t think your reason to help your friend, or to pursue a meaningful project, is that it will make the world slightly better, for example.
A related concern is that consequentialists have to accept an unappealing account of friendship, because their view implies that your friends are ultimately just another means of promoting the good, the same as anyone else. Progressive deontologists, by contrast, can recognize that friends are special. They can say that moral progress enables friendship in its most desirable, untarnished form: a form in which friends deserve special consideration, but not at the expense of the basic needs of others, needs which everyone deserves to have met equally.
The second thing that comes to mind is that I think we must sometimes be free to do what is imprudent or unwise. The consequentialist theory you describe, at least classically construed, cannot accommodate that idea.
Now, this doesn’t mean that the people of 2871 are free to neglect themselves. Their freedoms might still be circumscribed by the requirements of self-respect. However, I don’t think self-respect determines what we must do. It leaves options.
I like the Christian framing. The present generation can “buy” freedom for future generations by doing good works. We could put it this way were we feeling romantic: The present task of humanity is to create Heaven on Earth. To me, that all sounds quite noble. I can imagine future generations looking back at their ancestors with deep respect and admiration. But you’re right: on our own we cannot buy our freedom. In a way, that is sad.
Curious what you make of new directions in consequentialism such as 1) scalar consequentialism (no permissible/impermissible, just better and worse) and 2) agent-centered consequentialism.
https://global.oup.com/academic/product/morality-by-degrees-9780198844990
https://www.pdcnet.org/C1257AEE006039C4/file/D211B6D6D020A421852585A60049C78E/$FILE/resphilosophica_2020_0097_0003_0003_0020.pdf
https://academic.oup.com/book/8154
Thanks for the questions!
I think scalar consequentialism is great. Every consequentialist should be a scalar consequentialist. In fact, the best defense of consequentialism I’ve ever seen has not been any academic paper, but rather Richard Chappell's blog @rychappell. That being said, I don’t think scalar consequentialism avoids the problem I raise. I argue that it would be absurd to say one is obligated to maximize utility in utopia. Now, the scalar consequentialist need not make that claim. But they still have to claim that it is most reasonable to maximize utility in utopia. And that seems nearly just as implausible to me. So, I think scalar consequentialism has been a nice development, though I don’t think it solves all of consequentialism’s problems.
I have less strong opinions about the “consequentializers”, mainly because I don't know much about them. I’d need to see how they handle options, because those are important to me. But if one could “consequentialize” progressive deontology, then I’m not sure I’d be opposed, though I’m not sure of what significance this would be.
Nice article!
I've always wondered what deontology should say about the dynamics of relationship formation.
You write:
"Special obligations are obligations we have to people due to our relationships with them. For example, you might be obligated to help your friend over a stranger because they are your friend."
In that case, would it be best to minimize forming relationships in the first place, so that we can avoid burdensome obligations, which lessen our ability to focus on helping those most in need from an agent-neutral standpoint?
It seems to me like traditional deontologists end up saying that we are permitted to ignore the significant needs of strangers for the sake of the trivial needs of our friends in the name of "friendship". If that is really what friendship is, then it requires us to make the world worse in intuitively unacceptable ways. So, I don't think that could be what friendship is. In my view, what makes friendship special is not that friends sacrifice the well-being of strangers for each other. What makes friendship special has more to do with the fact that friends sacrifice their *own* well-being for each other--well-being that they must be entitled to in the first place. So, in my view, we do not have to avoid forming friendships now, because special obligations do not permit us to ignore the basic needs of others in the first place.
Thanks. I may follow-up on that another day.
Nice essay. I love the options/constraints framing. A couple of thoughts:
(1) Why can’t consequentialists accommodate your insights by noting that, as the world improves and opportunities for effective altruism dwindle, you get relatively more bang for your moral buck by focusing on your own projects and plans?
(2) Your view has a Christian feel: through good works we “buy” our freedom (“as soon as coin in coffer rings, the soul from purgatory springs”). But whereas christianity is individualistic your view is collectivist: I, as an individual, can’t buy my freedom with good works, no matter how much I do, as long as there are basic needs unmet. But why not? If deontology has any virtues, it’s that it gives individuals freedom from collective responsibility. If you’re not going to give us that you might as well be a consequentialist proper, no?
Thanks Misha! Those are really interesting points. Here are some thoughts I had about them.
Okay, so maybe a consequentialist can design their theory so that in 2871 our prudential reasons align with our consequentialist reasons. Hence, what makes the world slightly better happens to be intuitively worthwhile things like working on personal projects. But I have some doubts:
The first thing that comes to mind is that this consequentialist theory is still not generating the right kinds of reasons. I don’t think your reason to help your friend, or to pursue a meaningful project, is that it will make the world slightly better, for example.
A related concern is that consequentialists have to accept an unappealing account of friendship, because their view implies that your friends are ultimately just another means of promoting the good, the same as anyone else. Progressive deontologists, by contrast, can recognize that friends are special. They can say that moral progress enables friendship in its most desirable, untarnished form: a form in which friends deserve special consideration, but not at the expense of the basic needs of others, needs which everyone deserves to have met equally.
The second thing that comes to mind is that I think we must sometimes be free to do what is imprudent or unwise. The consequentialist theory you describe, at least classically construed, cannot accommodate that idea.
Now, this doesn’t mean that the people of 2871 are free to neglect themselves. Their freedoms might still be circumscribed by the requirements of self-respect. However, I don’t think self-respect determines what we must do. It leaves options.
I like the Christian framing. The present generation can “buy” freedom for future generations by doing good works. We could put it this way were we feeling romantic: The present task of humanity is to create Heaven on Earth. To me, that all sounds quite noble. I can imagine future generations looking back at their ancestors with deep respect and admiration. But you’re right: on our own we cannot buy our freedom. In a way, that is sad.